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{Pell. endf:'. § il23) and the crime of extortion involves moral 
turpitude. (.llatter of Coffey, 123 CaL 522 L56 P. 448].) 
It is, therefore, ordered that Manassee Stephen Libarian 
be suspended from the practice of law for a period of six 
mOllths commencing 30 days after the date of the filing of 
t his opinion. 
CARTER, J.-I dissent. 
1 agree that the letter written by petitioner to Nadel's 
attoruey constituted a technical violation of section 523 of 
the Penal Code, and should not, therefore, have been sent. 
But, considering petitioner's background and the fact that 
the letter was written to an attorney regarding a claim against 
hili client involving a small sum of money, advising that 
petitioner's client would go to the district attorney and seek 
to institute a criminal prosecution against Nadel unless the 
claim was paid, I do not feel that the discipline recommended 
is justified, and that a reprimand would be more commen-
surate with the nature of the conduct shown by the record. 
Petitioner, no doubt, mistakenly believed that the end he 
sought to achieve justified the means employed, and since 
no fraud or bad faith on his part was shown, and no detri-
ment was suffered by anyone as the result of his conduct, a 
suspension of six months from practice seems too severe. 
I would, therefore, dispose of the proceeding with a rep-
rimand. 
[L. A. Xo. 22158. In Bank. Jan. 29, 1952.] 
S'l'A'fE ReBBISH COLLECTORS ASSOCIATION (a Cor-
poration), Appellant, v. JOHN W. SILIZNOFF, Re-
spondent. 
[11 Assault-CivU Cases-Threats.-A cause of action is estab-
lished when it is shown that one,in the absence of any priv-
ilt·ge. intcntionall~' subjects another to the mental suffering 
incident to serious threats to his physical well-being, whether 
01' not the threats are made under such circumstances as to 
constitute a technical assault. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Assault, § 49; [2] Damages, § 22; 
[3] Torts, §4.1; [4] Damages, §23; [5] Evidence, §I71; [6] Evi-
dence, §I77; [7] Constitutional Law, § 120; [8] Trial, §159; 
[9) Assault, ~ 58(2); [10] Trial, § 136; [11] Appeal and Error, 
§ 195; [12] Agency, § 193; [13] Damages, § 89; [14] Damages, § 95. 
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[2] Damages-Mental Suffering.-If a cause of action is other-
wise established, dmnagl's may he gi\'cn for mental suffering 
naturally ensuing froll1 the acts complained of, and in caseR 
where mental suffering constitutes the principal or major 
I'lemellt of damages a recovery will not be denied because 
defendant's intentional misconduct fell sllOrt of producing 
some physical injury. 
[3] Torts-Interference With Mental or Emotional Tranquillity.-
That administrative difficulties may arise in determining what 
in\"aRions of mental and emotional tranquillity are sufficiently 
serious to be actionable does not warrant denial of relief. 
[4] Damages-Mental Suffering-rright.-A rubbish collectors' as-
sociation is liable for damages for illness resulting from fright 
caused br its threats to compel defendant either to give up 
or pay for II collection account which he took from an asso-
ciation member. 
[5] Evidence-Threats.-In a cross-action by defendant against a 
rubbish collectors' association for damages for illness result-
ing from fright caused by its threats to compel defendant 
to give up or pay for a collection account which he took 
froll1 an association member, evidence of threats made by 
the association inspector and its directors against other non-
members of the association to compel them to relinquish 
accounts which they had solicited from customers of mem-
bers is rele\'ant and admissible for the purpose of showing 
methods adopted by the association to protect its members 
from competition by nonmembers. 
[6] Id.-Value of Property. - In a cross-action by defendant 
against a rubbish collectors' association for'damages for iII-
nl'ss resulting from fright caused by its threats to compel 
defendant Pit her to give up or pay for a collection account 
w'hich he took from an association member, it is not error 
to pxcillde evidence that rubbish accounts, including the ac-
count in question, constitute property rights and have definite 
property values in the rubbish collection business, where such 
pvidpnce is immaterial in view of the fact that defendant 
~I'eurl'd the account, not through the association member, but 
b~· l'oli~iting it fi'om thc customer. 
[2] Right to recover for mental pain and anguish alone, apart 
from other damages, notes, 23 A.L.R. 361; 44 A.L.R. 428; 56 
A.L.R. 657. See, also, CaI.Jur., Damages, § 34; Am.Jur., Torts, 
§ 55. 
[3] Civil liability for insulting or abusive language not amount-
ing to defamation, note, 15 A.L.R.2d 108. See, also, Am.Jur. 
Torts, § 45 et seq. 
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[7] Constitutional Law-Fundamental Rights-Right to Engage 
in Occupations.-A nonmember of a rubbish collectors' asso-
ciation has a right to compete for a customer's business in 
the open market, and if he takes such business from an asso-
ciation member he is under no obligation to pay such mem-
ber for it. 
[8] Trial-Instructions-Applicability to Evidence.-In a cross-
action by defendant against a rubbish collectors' association 
for damages for illness resulting from fright caused by its 
threats to compel defendant either to give up or pay for a 
collection account which he took from an association mem-
ber, it is not error to instruct the jury that no legal arbitra-
tion had taken place between the parties, although the by-
laws of the association provide for arbitration between the 
members in case of dispute, where defendant did not join 
the association until after the dispute over the account was 
purportedly settled, and there is no evidence that he agreed 
before that time to submit the controversy to the associa-
tion's board of directors for settlement. (See Code Civ. 
Proc., § 1280 et seq.) 
[9] Assault-Civil Cases-Instructions.-In a cross-action by de-
fendant against a rubbish collectors'. association for damages 
for illness resulting from fright caused by its threats to com-
pel defendant either to give up or pay for a collection ac-
count which he took from an association member, an instruc-
tion that "an unlawful intent by one to inflict injury upon 
the person of another is that intent to act which wilfully 
disregards the right of a person to live without being placed 
in fear of personal safety" does not inform the jury that 
it may return a verdict for defendant based on a finding 
of an unlawful intent alone. 
[10] Trial-Instructions-Requests-Necessity for.-A party de-
siring more specific instructions on the law of the case should 
request them. (Code Civ. Proc., § 607a.) 
[11] Appeal-Objections-Conduct of Counsel.-Alleged prejudi-
cial misconduct of counsel may not be raised on appeal where 
no objections or assignments of misconduct were made at the 
trial, and the court was not asked to instruct the jury to dis-
regard the challenged remarks. 
[12] Agency-Relation Between Principal and Third Person-De-
licta of Agent.-In a cross-action by defendant against a rub-
bish collectors' association for damages for illness resulting 
from fright caused by its threats to compel defendant either 
to give up or pay for a collection account which he took from 
an association member, the association cannot attack a judg-
ment against it because of the jury's failure to return a ver-
dict against its agent, alleged to be the principal·tort feasor, 
where there is nothing in the pleadings or instructions which 
) 
.Jan. 1952] STATE HUBBISH ETC. ASSN. V. SILIZNOFF 3:33 
[38 C.2d 330; 240 P.2d 2821 
indicates that the failure to find with respect to the agent 
was intended as a verdict in his favor, and the transcript of 
proceedings on motion for new trial indicates that it was 
an inadvertence on the part of the jury caused by failure 
to provide it with a form for a verdict against him. 
[13] Damages-Excessive Damages-When Award Will Be Set 
Aside.-Question of excessive damages is addressed primarily 
to the discretion of the trial court, and an award which 
stands approved by that court will not be disturbed on ap-
peal unless it appears that the jury was influenced by passion 
or prejudice. 
[14] ld.-Excessive Damages-Illness Resulting From Fright.-
In a cross-action by defendant against a rubbish collectors' 
association for damages for illness resulting from fright 
caused by its threats to compel defendant either to give up 
or pay for a collection account which he took from an asso-
ciation member, a verdict awarding defendant $1,250 gen-
eral and special damages was not so excessive as to indicate 
that it was the result of prejudice and passion; and any 
excessiveness in an additional award of $7,500 exemplary 
damages was cured by the trial court's reduction of those 
damages to $4,000. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County. William S. Baird, Judge. Affirmed. 
Action by an association on promissory notes, in which 
defendant filed cross-complaint to cancel notes and for dam-
ages for assaults made by plaintiff and its agents to compel 
him to join the association and pay for a collection account 
taken from an association member. JUdgment for defendant 
affirmed. 
John C. Stevenson and Lionel Richman for. Appellant. 
Borah & Borah and Peter T; Rice for Respondent. 
TRAYNOR, J.-On February 1, 1948, Peter Kobzeff signed 
a contract with the Acme Brewing Company to collect rub-
bish from the latter's brewery. Kobzeff had been in the 
rubbish business for several years and was able to secure 
the contract because Acme was dissatisfied with the service 
then being provided by another collector, one Abramoff. 
Although Kobzeff signed the contract, it was understood that 
the work should be done by John Siliznoff, Kobzeff's 80n-
:l:H STATE Hn3B[SH ETC. Ass:-.-. C. S[L[Z!'oiOF~' [38 C.2d 
in-law, whom Kobzeff wished to assist in establishing a rub-
bish collection business. 
Both Kobzeff and Abramoff were members of the plaintiff 
State Rubbish Collectors Association, but Siliznoff was not. 
The b~'-laws of the association provided that one member 
should not take an account from another member without 
paying for it. Usual prices ranged from five to ten times 
the monthly rate paid by the customer, and disputes were 
l'pferred to the board of directors for settlement. After 
Abramoff lost the Acme account he complained to the asso-
('iation, and Kobzeff was called upon to settle the matter. 
Kobzeff aud Silizl10ff took the position that the Acme ac-
('ollnt belonged to Silizl1off, and that he was under no obliga-
tion to pay for it. After attending several meetings of plain-
tiff's board of directors Siliznoff finally agreed, however, 
to pay Abramoff $1,850 for the Acme account and join the 
association. The agreement provided that he should pay 
$500 in 30 days and $75 per month thereafter until the 
whole sum agreed upon was paid. Payments were to be 
made through the association, and Siliznoff executed a series 
of promissory notes totaling $1,850. None of these notes 
was paid, and in 1949 plaintiff association brought this action 
to collect the notes then payable. Defendant cross-complained 
and- asked that the notes be cancelled because of duress and 
waut of consideration. In addition he sought general and 
exemplary damages because of assaults made by plaintiff and 
its agents to compel him to join the association and pay 
Abl'amofl' for the Acme account. The jury returned a ver-
dict against plaintiff and for defendant on the complaint 
and for defendant on his cross-complaint. It awarded him 
$1,250 general and special damages and $7,500 exemplary 
damages. The trial court denied a motion for a new trial 
on the condition that defendant consent to a reduction of 
the exemplary damages to $4,000. Defendant filed the re-
quired consent, and plaintiff has appealed from the judg-
ment. 
Plaintiff's primary contention is that the evidence is in-
sufficient to support the judgment. Defendant testified that 
shortly after he secured the Acme account, the president of 
the association and its inspector, John Andikian, called on 
him and Kobzeff. They suggested that either a settlement 
be made with Abramoff or that the job be dropped, and reo 
quested Kobzeff and defendant to attend a meeting of the 
association. At this meeting defendant was told that the 
) 
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association "ran all the rubbish from that office. aU thE' 
rubbish hauling," and that if he did not pay for the job 
the~' would take it away from him. "'We would take it 
away. even if we had to haul for nothing' ... [O]ne of i 
them mentioned that I had better pay up, or else." There-
after, on the day. when defendant finally agreed to pay for 
the account, Andikian visited defendant at the Rainier Brew-
ing Company, where he was collecting rubbish. Andikian 
told defendant that" 'We will give you up till tonight to 
get down to the board meeting and make some kind of ar-
rangements or agreements about the Acme Brewery, or other-
wise we are going to beat you up.' ... He says he either 
would hire somebody or do it himself. And I says, ' Well, 
what would they do to me l' He says, well, they would physi-
cally beat me up first, cut up the truck tires or burn the 
truek, or otherwise put me out of business completely. He 
said if I didn't appE'ar at that meeting and make some kind 
of all agreement that they would do that, but he says up 
to then they would let me alone,but if I walked out of that 
meeting that night they would beat me up for sure." De-
fendant attE'nded the meeting and protested that he owed 
nothing for the Acme account and in any event could not 
pay the amount demanded. He was again told by the pres-
ident of the association that "that table right there [the 
board of clirE'<!tol'S] ran all the rubbish collecting in Los An-
geles and if there was any routes to be gotten that ther 
would get them and distribute them among their mem-
bers. . . ." After two hours of further discussion defendant 
agreed to join the association and pay for the Acme account. 
He promised to return the next day and sign the necessary 
papers. He tE'stified that tlw only reason "they let me go 
homE', is that. I promised that I would sign the notes the 
very next morning." The president "made me promise on 
m~' honor and ewrything else, and I was scared, and I knew i: 
I had to ('ome back, so I beliew he knew I was scared anrl 
that I would come back. That's the only reason they l('t 
me go home." Defenl1allt also testified that because of th(' 
fright he suffered during his dispute with the associatio11 
he became ill and vomited several times and had to remain 
away from work for a period of several days. 
Plaintiff contends that the evidence does not establish an 
assault against defendant because the threats made all re-
lated to action that might take place in the future; that 
neither Andikian nor members of the board of directors 
) 
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threatened immediate physical harm to d~fendant. (See 
Lowry v. Stalldard Oil Co., 63 Cal.App.2d 1, 6-7 [146 P.2d 
57] j Restatement, Torts, § 29.) [1] We have concluded, how-
ever, that a cause of action is established when it is shown 
that one, in the absence of any privilege, intentionally sub-
jects another to the mental suffering incident to' serious 
threats to his physical well-being, whether or not the threats 
are made under such circumstances as to constitute a tech-
nical assault. 
In the past it has frequently been stated that the interest 
in emotional and mental tranquillity is not one that the 
law will protect from invasion in its own right. (Newman 
v. Smith, 77 Cal. 22, 27 [18 P. 791] ; Easton v. United Trade 
School (Jontr. Co., 173 Cal. 199, 204 [159 P. 597, L.R.A. 
1917A 394] j Cook v. Maier, 33 Cal.App.2d 581, 584 [92 P.2d 
434] j see 52 Am .• Jur., Torts, § 45, p. 388, and cases cited; 
Bohlen, Right to Recover for Injury Resulting from Negli-
gence Without Impact, 41 Am.L.Reg., N.S., 141, 142-143.) 
As late as 1934 the Restatement of Torts took the position 
that" The interest in mental and emotional tranquillity and, 
therefore, in freedom from mental and emotional disturbance 
is not, as a thing in itself, regarded as of sufficient impor-
tance to require others to refrain from conduct intended or 
recognizably likely to cause such a disturbance." (Restate-
ment, Torts, § 46, comment c.) The Restatement explained 
the rule allowing recovery for the mere apprehension of 
bodily harm in traditional assault cases as an historical 
anomaly (§ 24, comment c), and the rule allowing recovery 
for insulting conduct by an employee of a common carrier 
as justified by the necessity of securing for the public com-
fortable as well as safe service. (§ 48, comment c.) 
The Restatement recognized, however, that in many cases 
mental distress could be so intense that it could reasonably 
be foreseen that illness or other bodily harm might result. 
If the defendant intentionally subjected the plaintiff to such 
distress and bodily harm resulted, the defendant would be 
liable for negligently causing the plaintiff bodily harm. (Re-
statement, Torts, §§ 306, 312.) Under this theery the cause 
of action was not founded on a right to be free from in-
tentional interference with mental tranquillity, but on the 
right to be free from negligent interference with physical 
well-being. A defendant who intentionally subjected an-
other to mental distress without intending to cause bodily 
harm would nevertheless be liable for resulting bodily harm 
I 
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if he should have foreseen that the mental distress might 
cause such harm. 
The California cases have been in accord with the Re-
statement in allowing recovery where physical injury re- I 
suIted from intentionally subjecting the plaintiff to serious 
mental distress. (Emden v. Vitz, 88 Cal.App.2d 313, 319 
[198 P.2d 696] ; Bowden v. Spiegel, Inc., 96 Cal.App.2d 793, 
794-795 [216 P.2d 571]; Richardson v. Pridmore, 97 Cal. 
App.2d 124,129-130 [217 P.2d 113, 17 A.L.R.2d 929J.) . 
The view has been forcefully advocated that the law should 
protect emotional and mental tranquillity as such against 
serious and intentional invasions (see Goodrich, Emotional 
Disturbance as Legal Damages, 20 Mich.L.Rev. 497, 508-513; 
Magruder, Mental and Emotional Disturbance in the Law 
of Toris, 49 Harv.L.Rev. 1033, 1064-1067; Wade, Tort Lia-
bility for Abusive and Insulting Language, 4 Vanderbilt L. 
Rev. 63, 81-82), and there is a growing body of case law 
supporting this position. (See, e.g., Barnett v. Oollecti&n 
Service Co., 214 Iowa 1303, 1312 [242 N.W. 25] ; Richard-
son v. Pridmore, 97 Cal.App.2d 124, 129-130 [217 P.2d 113, 
17 A.L.R.2d 929J; Prosser, Torts, § 11, p. 54 et seq., and 
cases cited; 15 A.L.R.2d 108.) In recognition of this de-
velopment the American Law Institute amended section 46 
of the Restatement of Torts in 1947 to provide: 
"One who, without a privilege to do so, intentionally 
causes severe emotional distress to another is liable (a) for 
such emotional distress, and (b) for bodily harm resulting 
from it. " 
In explanation it stated that "The interest in freedom 
from severe emotional distress is regarded as of sufficient 
importance to require others to refrain from conduct intended 
to invade it. Such conduct is tortious. The injury suffered 
by the one whose interest is invaded is frequently far more 
serious to him than certain tortious invasions of the interest 
in bodily integrity and other legally protected interests. In 
the absence of a privilege, the actor's conduct has no social 
utility; indeed it is anti-social. No reason or policy requires 
such an actor to be protected from the liability which usually 
attaches to the wilful wrongdoer whose efforts are successfuL" 
(Restatement of the Law, 1948 Supplement, Torts, § 46, com-
ment d.) 
There are persuasive arguments and analogies that sup-
port the recognition of a right to be free from serious, in-
tentional, and unprivileged invasions of mental and emo-
) 
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tional tranquillity. [2] If a cause of action. is otherwise 
established, it is settled that damages may be given for mental 
suffering naturally ensuing from the acts complained of 
(Deevy v. Tassi, 21 Ca1.2d 109, 120 (130 P.2d 389] ; Merrill 
v. Los Angeles Gas &- Elec. 00., 158 C&1.499, 513 [111 P. 534, 
139 Am.St.Rep. 134, 31 L.R.A. N.S. 559]), and in the case 
of many torts, snch as assault, battery, false imprisonment, 
and defamation, mental suffering will frequently constitute 
the principal element of damages. (See Deev1J v. Tassi, supra; 
Restatement, Torts, § 905, comment c.) Incases where mental 
suffering constitutes a major element of damages it is anom-
alons to deny recovery because the defendant's intentional 
misconduct fell short of producing some physical injury. 
It may be contended that to allow recovery in the ab-
sence of physical injury will open the door to unfounded 
claims and a flood of litigation, and that the requirement 
that there be physical injury is necessary to insure that seri-
ous mental snffering actually occurred. The jury is ordi-
narily in a better position, however, to determine whether 
outrageous conduct results in mental distress than whether 
that distress in turn results in physical injury. From their 
own experience jurors are aware of the extent and charac-
ter of the disagreeable emotions that may result from the 
defendant's conduct, but a difficult medic&1question is pre-
sented when it must be determined if emotional distress re-
sulted in physical injury. (See Smith, Relation of Emo-
tions to 1njll.ry and Disease, 30 Va.L.Rev. 193, 303-306.) 
Greater proof that mental suffering occurred is found in 
the defendant's conduct designed to bring it about than 
in physical injury that mayor may not have resulted there-
from. 
[3] That administrative difficulties do not justify the de-
nial of relief for serious invasions of mental and emotional 
tranquillity is demonstrated by the cases recognizing the 
right of privacy. Recognition of that right protects mental 
tranquillity from invasion by unwarranted and undesired 
publicity. (JlIelvin v. Reid, 112 Cal.App. 285, 289 (297 P. 
91] ; Restatement, Torts, § 867, comments c and d.) As in 
the case of the protection of mental tranquillity from other 
forms of invasion, difficult probleIllS in determining the kind 
and extent of invasions that are sufficiently serious to be 
actionable are presented. Also the public interest in the 
free dissemination of news must be considered. Neverthe-
less courts have concluded that the problems presented are 
) 
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not so insuperable that tllPY warrant the denial of relief 
altogether. 
[4] In the present ease plaintiff caused defendant to suf-
f!'t, extreme fright. By intentionally producing such fright 
it endeavored to compel him either to give up the Acme 
account or pay for it, and it had no right or privilege to 
adopt such coercive methods in competing for business. In 
these circumstances liability is clear. 
[5] Plaintiff contends that the trial court erred in ad-
mitting evidence of threats made by Andikian and members 
of the board of directors in 1950 against other nonmembers 
of the association to compel them to relinquish accounts they 
had solicited from customers of members of the association. 
This evidence was admitted to show the methods adopted by 
the association to protect its members from competition by 
nonmembers. It was relevant and admissible for that pur-
pose. (Evans v. Gibson, 220 Cal. 476, 482 [31 P.2d 389]; 
see People v, Coejield, 37 Ca1.2d 865, 869 [237 P.2d 570] ; 
2 Wigmore on Evidence [3d ed.] §§ 304, 371, pp. 202, 300.) 
[6] Plaintiff contends that the trial court erred in ex-
cluding evidence that rubbish accounts, including the Acme 
account, constitute property rights and have definite prop-
erty values in the rubbish collecting business. It contends 
that because it was not allowed to prove the value of rub-
bish accounts it could not prove that there was consideration 
for the notes signed by defendant. There would be merit in 
plaintiff's contention if defendant had given the notes in 
exchange for an assignment of the Acme contract or in con-
nection with the purchase of a going business. He secured 
the account, however, not through Abramoff, but by solicit-
ing it from Acme. [7] He had a right to compete for this 
business in the open market and was under no obligation to 
pay Abramoff for it. (Conf1'nental Car-Na-Var Corp. v. 
Moseley, 24 Cal.2d 104, 110 [148 P.2d 9].) Accordingly, 
the trial court correctly concluded that evidence of its value 
was immaterial. 
[8] Plaintiff contends that the trial court erred in in-
structing the jury that no legal arbitration had taken place 
between the parties. It points out that the by-laws provide 
for arbitration between the members and contends that its 
dispute with defendant was arbitrated under these provisions. 
Defendant did not join the association, however, until after 
the dispute over the Acme account was purportedly settled, 
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lIubmit the controversy to the association 's bo~d of direc-
tors for settlement. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 1280 et seq.) 
[9, 10] The trial court instructed the jury that" an unlaw-
ful intent by one to inflict injury upon the person of an-
other is that intent to act which wilfully disr~gards the right 
of a person to live without being placed in fear of personal 
safety. " Because specific instructions were not given cov-
ering all the elements of defendant's cause of action, plain-
tiff contends that this specific instruction on intent allowed 
the jury to return a verdict for defendant based on. a find-
ing of an unlawful intent alone. The instruction does not, 
however, so inform the jury, and had plaintiff desired more 
specific instructions on· the law of the case, it should have 
requested them. (Code Civ. Proc., § 607a; Hardy v. Schir-
mer, 163 Cal 272, 275 [124 P. 993] ; Perry v. City of San 
Diego, 80 Cal.App.2d 166, 171-172 [181 P.2d 98].) 
[11] Plaintiff contends that counsel for defendant was 
guilty of prejudicial misconduct by making an inflammatory 
closing argument to the jury. No objections or assignments 
of misconduct were made at the trial, and the court was not 
asked to instruct the jury to disregard the challenged re-
marks. It is therefore too late to· raise the point on appeal. 
(Cope v. Davison, 30Cal.2d 193, 202 [180 P.2d 873, 171 ! 
A.L.R. 667]; Aydlott v. Key System Transit Co., 104 OaL 
App. 621, 628 [286 P. 456].) 
[12] Plaintiff cont~nds that the judgment against it can-
not stand because the jury exonerated its agent Andikian, 
who was the principal tort feasor. The jury did not exon-
erate Andikian, however; the verdict was merely silent as 
to him. There is nothing in the pleadings or the instruc-
tions that indicates that the failure to find with respect to 
Andikian was intended as a verdict in his favor, and the 
transcript of the proceedings on the motion for new trial 
indicates that it was an inadvertence on the part of the 
jury caused by the failure to provide it with a form for a 
verdict against him. Under these circumstances plaintiff 
cannot attack the judgment against it because of the fail-
ure of the jury to return a verdict against its agent. (Bro-
kaw v. Black-Foze Military Institute, 37 Oa1.2d 274, 279-280 
[231 P.2d 816], and cases cited.) 
[13] Plaintiff contends finally that the damages were ex-
cessive. The question of excessiveness is addressed primarily 
to the discretion of the trial court, and an award that stands 
approved by that court ~m not be disturbed on appeal un-
